Ever since Frege, it has been standard practice in analytic philosophy to investigate the intentional structure of much human thought by inquiring into the logical structure of the language used by speakers to express it or to ascribe it to others.
Firstly, the causal model has trouble explaining ii , how we can reflect on the objects of our thoughts, and say something about them. Ryle insisted that perceiving itself is not a process and so it should not be described as such. Further, intentionalisms may be, as already suggested, either more or less restrictive or inclusive and this in various ways.
Not so with intentional relations. Daoism, indigenous religio-philosophical tradition that has shaped Chinese life for more than 2,000 years.
We have seen how Brentano addresses this concern, recently renewed in connection with contemporary theories see Kriegel 2009 and Siewert 2013b. A better way involves drawing a distinction between the representational content of a mental state or some other thing that has intentionality and the objects if any the mental state is about. Dretske, Lycan, and Tye, among others, endorse this determination claim. Objections to this conception of sense-experience became increasingly common towards the end of the twentieth century, from diverse angles and motivations, in writings affirming a variety of intentionalist positions.
But it does so only on the assumption that, when something is uncovered to me in my use of it, I experience it or am somehow conscious of it, and that, in being disclosed to myself though my activity, I am somehow self-conscious.
As in the other cases, the potential importance of consciousness seems diminished by separatism. If we indulge the notion of beings behaviorally similar to us, but, like Chalmersian zombies, utterly bereft of subjective experience—we should not suppose they would literally have personal-level psychology: As the first example indicates, a sentence can be intensional and yet have nothing to do with intentionality.
Oxford University Press, 2002.
Treatments of detachability may also have epistemic implications. If the teleological theory of intentionality were right, such a being would have no intentional states since its brain states would have no natural history, even though it would be physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from a thinking person.
Mooney, T. The belief that Brentano is Austrian is about Brentano. The paradigmatic non-intentional process is the process of natural selection by which Charles Darwin explained the phylogenetic evolution of biological species: Needless to say there are further arguments made on behalf of these proposals, but as things stand, there is no widely accepted solution to the problem presented by intensionality for naturalizing intentionality.
Clark, A. Now, selection processes can be intentional or non-intentional. For example, are intentional states essentially rational states, such that only rational creatures can have them?